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A HIGH-TECH START-UP’S DEBT FINANCING STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR
VALUING SOFT INFORMATION
ABSTRACT
How does entrepreneurial financing differ from traditional financing? This study sheds new light on this
central question of entrepreneurial finance literature by exploring the distinctive role of soft information
in a high-tech start-up’s debt financing. Entrepreneurial investors can obtain soft information from strong
relationships with potential investees and use the information to evaluate and select promising investees.
Using a dataset on 683 SBA 7(a) loan activities involved with information technology based start-ups,
this study provides empirical evidence that high-tech start-ups tend to experience a lower rate of default if
they are located close to the lending banks and the lending banks are of considerable size. These
conditions allow the lending banks to collect and utilize soft information regarding high-tech start-ups in
an efficient manner.
1. Introduction
High-tech start-ups are often unprofitable and lack the necessary resources. As a result, they must
gain access to external resources in order to exploit their entrepreneurial opportunities (Colombo and
Grilli 2005; Beckman and Burton 2008). Financial capital is especially essential to procure other types of
resources. These start-ups, however, often experience a “valley of death” transitional phase where
developing technology is deemed promising yet without validated commercial potential (National
Research Council 2009) and may fail to access the direct entrepreneurial finance market (e.g., private
equity). To overcome these financial constraints in this phase, high-tech start-ups often access the lending
market to continue exploiting their entrepreneurial opportunities. Indeed, banks are a critical source of
financing for start-ups, providing about 60% of debt financing to small businesses (Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta 2014). Especially, start-ups have increasingly utilized the SBA 7(a) loan program through
commercial banks in recent decades.
While the SBA 7(a) loan program provides a government-backed guarantee on the portion of
loans, banks are supposed to select qualified start-ups and take a portion of responsibility associated with
a default. This primary role of banks in the entrepreneurial finance is justified because they possess the
continuing ability to evaluate, process, disburse, service, and liquidate entrepreneurial loans (Dilger
2013). This unique role of banks raises a natural question about how entrepreneurial debt financing differs
from traditional credit financing. Specifically, “what information do banks use to evaluate and select
promising start-ups?” A growing body of finance literature suggests that banks are able to overcome the
asymmetric information problem by producing information about potential borrowers and using it in the
evaluation process. This question, however, remains not fully answered because such information is often
unavailable in the entrepreneurial lending market due to the nature of start-ups, which are young and have
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insufficient records about their operations. This question should be addressed in a new framework that
can be applied in the context of entrepreneurial finance.
A stream of the literature I considered in this study is the literature on soft information, which can
be readily applied within the context of entrepreneurial finance (Hodgman 1961; Kane and Malkiel 1965;
Fama 1985; Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993; Petersen and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995; Boot 2000;
Ongena and Smith 2000; Brau and Osteryoung 2001; Schenone 2004; Freixas 2005). High-tech start-ups
often have private information about the value of their entrepreneurial opportunities. This information is
not readily available for external stakeholders, including banks. This asymmetric information between
start-ups and banks creates uncertainty about their credit worthiness (Cole 1998), leads to credit rationing
equilibria (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), and invalidates other standard competitive market results (Broecker
1990). By this unique nature of entrepreneurial lending market, theories that have been discussed in the
literature of traditional credit market (e.g., perfect capital market, moral hazard, and adverse selection)
cannot be applied in the entrepreneurial lending market in the exact same manner.
In the entrepreneurial lending market, banks may obtain private information about high-tech startups through a continued relationship. This information can be used to set future contract terms or credit
underwriting decisions. Banks necessarily use this “soft” information, which is difficult to quantify and
transmit through the official communication channels, as well as “hard” information to provide
entrepreneurial finance in an appropriate manner (Brau and Osteryoung 2001; Stein 2002). In contrast,
these start-ups are likely to use their superior information position for their own benefits by selectively
sharing their soft information with banks. This tendency may become stronger if focal start-ups have a
high magnitude of soft information that would negatively affect banks’ decisions about whether the bank
lends and what conditions banks offer.
Using a longitudinal dataset on 683 SBA 7(a) loans associated with information technology based
start-ups between 1980 and 2005, this study provides empirical evidence that high-tech start-ups tend to
experience a lower rate of default if they are located close to the lending banks and the lending banks are
of considerable size. These conditions allow the lending banks to more efficiently collect and utilize soft
information regarding start-ups. Specifically, high-tech start-ups that are reluctant to share their soft
information, such as a perceived risk of default, may want to select banks that have difficulty reaching
their soft information. These start-ups come to prefer banks that are distant from them (e.g., distance
effect) and inferior to respond to local market competition (e.g., size effect). Furthermore, these distance
and size effects interact with each other in determining the defaults. This interaction effect suggests that
the distance effect is more salient when high-tech start-ups borrow from smaller banks, and vice versa.
2. Literature and Hypotheses Development
2.1. SBA 7(a) loan
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The goal of SBA 7(a) loan is to help start-ups resolve their financial constraints by providing loan
guarantee programs designed to encourage banks to provide entrepreneurial finance. Proceeds from SBA
7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion
of an existing business. To be eligible for the loan, a start-up must be located in the United States, be a
for-profit-operating business, qualify as small under the SBA’s size requirements, demonstrate a need for
the desired credit, and be certified by a banker designated by the SBA. The maximum loan amount is up
to $5 million (up to $3.75 million maximum guarantee). The average loan amount was $34,000 in 2012.
The maximum loan term is typically 10 years, and can be extended up to 25 years with extensions. Banks
are allowed to charge start-ups a reasonable fixed interest rate or a variable interest rate. The maximum
allowable fixed interest rate in 2013 was 9.42%. The interest rates vary by the loan amount and are
determined by a multi-step formula published in the Federal Register.
When a start-up submits an application for the SBA 7(a) loan, a bank reviews the application and
decides whether it merits a loan on its own or not. The SBA guarantee assures the bank that, if the start-up
does not repay the loan and the bank adhered to all applicable regulations concerning the loan, the SBA
will reimburse the bank for its loss, up to the percentage of the SAB’s guarantee. If the bank determines
that it is willing to provide the loan, but only with the SBA guarantee, it submits the application for
approval to the Standard 7(a) Loan Guaranty Processing Center. These centers eventually decide whether
or not to approve the applications. The SBA charges banks upfront a one-time guarantee fee and an
annual ongoing servicing fee, which cannot exceed 5.55% per year of the outstanding balance of the
SBA’s share of the loans. The bank may charge a start-up reasonable fees customary for similar banks in
the geographic area where the loan is being made for packaging and other services.
There is a debate that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist start-ups that
would create more jobs (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989).
Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal
deficit and that many of the small businesses are not Schumpeterian innovators – they do not attempt to
introduce new ideas, nor do they seek to enter a new or underserved market (Hurst and Pugsley 2011;
Neumark et al. 2011; Haltiwanger et al. 2013). This debate is still ongoing in the literature. Some studies
report that a small but positive and statistically significant relationship exists between guaranteed loans
and regional economics (Riding and Haines Jr. 2001; Craig et al. 2007; Lee 2013). Young et al. (2014)
find that the SBA lending activity has a negative effect on per capita income growth; and De Andrade and
Lucas (2009) find that the SBA loan borrowers are charged rates that are no lower than on comparable
uninsured securities.
It is surprising that little is known about what information banks do use to evaluate and select
promising high-tech start-ups, which would facilitate long-term economic developments. It is important
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to understand these issues because it helps us understand what strategy a start-up does use to obtain
necessary entrepreneurial debt financing and how the entrepreneurial lending resource is allocated in an
effective and efficient manner. In a broad sense, these issues explore what external contingencies shape
the entrepreneurial finance market. By filling this gap in the literature, we are able to better understand
how start-ups respond to overcome their financial constraints.
2.2. Information asymmetry and soft information in the entrepreneurial lending market
Start-ups want to acquire necessary capital to exploit their entrepreneurial opportunities, and
banks need investment opportunities that match up deposits and borrows for reasonable rates of return.
These two parties exchange their resources with each other in the entrepreneurial lending market.
However, they may have difficulties when purchasing and exchanging resources, particularly due to
limited information about each other (Duhaime and Schwenk 1985; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Coff
1999; Reuer and Koza 2000; Barkema and Schijven 2008; Sleptsov and Anand 2008; Agarwal et al.
2012). The conventional wisdom on the role of banks provides dichotomous perspectives. On one hand,
banks constitute an important source of specialized information and expertise for entrepreneurial lending.
On the other hand, the appropriate information flow from start-ups may not occur for a variety of reasons,
including lack of recording, inadequate incentives, and conflicts of interests.
Start-ups are typically much more informationally opaque than larger corporations because they
often do not have certified audited financial statements to yield credible financial information on a regular
basis (Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005). Due to this opacity, start-ups take superior positions in terms of
the use of information, when compared with banks, and thus determine the ability and willingness of
providing their private information (Hansen 1999). This information asymmetry is more salient within the
context of high-tech based industries because high-tech start-ups often pursue technologies that would be
the most important resources and difficult to understand without the expertise in the field. Banks, in
contrast, should seek a number of lending technologies to cope with the information asymmetry. They
necessarily use hard information and combine it with relatively limited data about start-ups using
statistical methods to predict future credit performance. The hard information includes credit history,
identifiable assets, and business data involved with the stock holders of start-ups. Hard information is
useful because it is available in the secondary market with lower cost and yields significant growth in the
credit availability of start-ups.
For an alternative information source, banks use soft information gathered through contacts over
time with start-ups, including the owners, managers, and other members of local communities. Soft
information refers to any kind of data other than the relatively transparent and public information about
the start-up such as financial statements or the availability of collateral. Soft information is essentially
qualitative in nature, so it cannot be easily or verifiably recorded in written form (Garcıa-Appendini
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2011). It takes a significant amount of time to accumulate soft information about start-ups. Banks may
interchangeably use soft and hard information to allocate their credits among start-ups.
2.3. Hypotheses development
Soft information may travel within a specific range of local community because such information
is difficult to communicate and quantify. Banks often should have a local presence to maintain direct and
indirect contacts with start-ups to collect soft information (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell
1995). Typically, this would increase the cost of having large scale, geographically spread-out lending
operations, implying strong diseconomies of scale in the entrepreneurial lending (Petersen and Rajan
2002). Beyond the range of community, start-ups are more likely to exert their efforts, if necessary, to
conceal the soft information that would negatively affect the likelihood of loan approvals and contract
terms.
As such, if the physical distance between start-ups and banks increases, the contacts between two
parties may become more impersonal and dependent on hard information. The nature of this relationship
gives start-ups the incentive to release hard information that is prepared by their loan professionals, such
as brokers, accountants, and lawyers, in favor of them. Start-ups are also able to provide selected soft
information in this regime. Thus, the distance between the two parties creates a greater information
asymmetry. Especially, start-ups that perceive a high chance of default or predict the unpromising future
of business are more likely to access banks at a distance. These banks may be unable to access the soft
information. If this conjecture is true, we will see:
Hypothesis 1. High-tech start-ups are likely to experience a lower rate of default when they are
close to the lending banks.
Large banks may be able to serve start-ups well by using a greater volume of hard information,
such as credit scoring and lending against fixed asset collateral with values (Frame, Srinivasan, and
Woosley 2001; Frame, Padhi, and Woosley 2004; Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005; Berger and Udell
2006). Large banks have also recently come to maintain decentralized decision making structures and are
able to respond more to local market competition (Canales and Nanda 2011), allowing them to have better
access to soft information. Combining both types of information, large banks may outcompete in the
entrepreneurial lending market. In other words, large banks can reduce information asymmetry by using
their rich resources and better organizational structures that smaller banks would not emulate. As a result,
start-ups that want to conceal the negative soft information are less likely to access large banks.
Notice that contrary to my prediction, it can be argued that small banks are better able to form
strong relationships with start-ups, while large banks tend to serve more transparent firms (Berger and
Udell 2002; Stein 2002). This approach seems reasonable in the traditional lending market in which banks
are able to prefer a specific group of applicants, but less so in the context of entrepreneurial lending
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market. As long as large banks compete in the entrepreneurial lending market, their applicants cannot be
transparent. If they maintain decentralized structure, the structure is likely to be advantageous for them in
terms of accessing both soft and hard information. If this conjecture is true, we will see:
Hypothesis 2. High-tech start-ups are likely to experience a lower rate of default when they
borrow from the large banks.
3. Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1. Data
For the purpose of this study, I utilized two data sources, including a dataset on SBA 7(a) loan
activity involved with information technology based start-ups from the SBA via a Freedom of
Information Act request, and the Bank Regulatory database available from Wharton Research Data
Services. The SBA has several loan programs. Their main effort is the 7(a) loan program that facilitates
loans to existing small businesses by guaranteeing varying percentages of loans. The maximum guarantee
is typically 75% of the loan amount. I limited my sample within 7(a) loan program because this program
is over 90% of loans approved by the SBA and intended to encourage long-term entrepreneurial financing
for start-ups.
The SBA provided a number of variables, including the identities of lending banks and start-ups,
loan amounts, and interest rates associated with each individual loan. Furthermore, I was able to obtain
data on loan failure (i.e., default) amounts on each loan. This data allows me to estimate the actual default
rates of individual loans, which are, on average, 8% according to my sample. This actual default rate is
considerably lower than the probability of SBA loan failures (i.e., 17%) estimated by prior studies
(Treacy and Carey 1998; Glennon and Nigro 2005), and higher than the average loan failure rates of the
U.S. commercial banks (i.e., 3.5%) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/delallsa.htm).
The Bank Regulatory database provides financial accounting data for regulated depository
financial institutions, including bank holding companies, commercial banks, saving banks, and saving and
loans institutions. The source of the data comes from the required regulatory forms filed for supervising
purposes. Specifically, I use the Commercial Bank database from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. It
contains data from all banks filing the Report of Condition and Income that are regulated by the Federal
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency. From these
data sources, I was able to obtain the total amounts of assets and the net income of sample banks. My
dataset is composed of 683 individual SBA 7(a) loans borrowed by information technology based startups.
3.2. Dependent variable: default
I define an outcome variable (i.e., default) as the log amount of default at the end of individual
loan term. All dollar values are converted into 2005 constant dollars using the GDP deflator. Ideally, one
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would measure the amount of default by observing at the time of loan approval to alleviate time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity that may lead me to mistakenly estimate the effects of independent variables on
default.1 However, such a measure is hardly available at the level of individual loan, except for a
perceptual measure that also may lead to a bias in parameter estimation (Ketokivi and Schroeder 2004).
For a sensitivity analysis, I use the rank variable of default (i.e., default rank). The greater rank denotes a
greater value of default. This approach alleviates my concerns about the abnormal effects of outliers.
3.3. Independent variables
3.3.1. Distance
Distance measures the linear distance between the zip codes of a start-up and a bank. All the
longitude/latitude data came from the 2000 U.S. Census. I use a simple distance calculation method that
calculates the distance in miles by passing the latitude and longitude coordinates. For a robust check and
to refine the effect of distance, I also examine the effects of city and state boarder lines. I create a set of
dummy variables, including same city and same state, and replace these variables with distance in some
models. Same city equals one if a start-up borrows from a bank located within the borderline of same city,
and zero otherwise. Similarly, same state equals one if a start-up does from a bank located within the
borderline of same state, and zero otherwise.
3.3.2. Bank size
Bank size is measured by the log of total assets of a bank (Berger, Goulding, and Rice 2014). I
believe this measure may capture the effect of bank size on what technologies will be used to evaluate
loan applications by the bank. However, I also use national bank (16) and national bank (41) to elaborate
the effect of bank size in some models for a sensitivity analysis. National bank (16) equals one if a bank
has branches spanning 16 states (i.e., the mean of the number of states in which banks have branches in
the sample), and zero otherwise. Similarly, national bank (41) equals one if a bank has branches in over
41 states (i.e., the 90th percentile of the number of states in which banks have branches in the sample).
These two variables will help examine the spatial size as well as the monetary size of bank.
3.4. Control variables
3.4.1. Loan characteristics
The loan characteristics, including loan amount and loan interest rate, can impact the likelihood
of the defaults of start-ups (Glennon and Nigro 2005; Riding and Haines 2001). The former is measured
by the log of the amount of individual loans, and the latter is the interest rates approved with the loans. As
the dollar amount of loan increases, banks are likely to utilize a more rigorous asset protection in the
event that borrowers do not repay the bank credits, impacting the variation of default. Interest rates on
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individual loans inversely reflect how start-ups have capacities to repay bank credits, and represent the
financial burdens imposed on them.
3.4.2. Bank net income
Bank net income is measured by the log of a bank’s net income. Bank net income is a measure of
banks’ financial performances and has been found to affect the likelihood of effective monitoring and
controlling of the banks’ loan processes (Cole 1998). As such, banks that already have strong financial
performances are more likely to select start-ups that are more likely to repay the bank credits.
3.4.3. Fixed effects: Ownership, state, year fixed effects.
I use several fixed effects in the following analyses. First, ownership fixed effects control for the
ownership structure of start-ups. This variable is categorized into three groups, including sole
proprietorships, limited partnerships, and corporations. The ownership structure can determine how much
soft information banks will use. For example, a bank may need more soft information for a start-up that
has a single owner because this start-up does not produce sufficient hard information. Second, state fixed
effects control for states in which start-ups operate. These fixed effects control for institutional factors that
are different among states, such as tax conditions and entrepreneurial policies. Finally, year fixed effects
control for time varying conditions. The risk of default is not constant, but varies significantly over time
according to the current economic conditions (Glennon and Nigro 2005).
3.5. Empirical specification
I use two econometric approaches to estimate the effects of distance and bank size on default,
including ordinary least squares (OLS) and negative binomial (NB) regressions. The OLS regression
approach, which has been popular due to its simplicity, performs a one-tailed t-test on one variable of
interest and all observable exogenous variables in the regression of other variables of interest (Lokshin et
al. 2007). In the OLS specification, I estimate the following models: 𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , where 𝐶𝑖
denotes my dependent variable, default; 𝑋𝑖 are independent variables of interest, including distance and
bank size; and 𝑍𝑖 are control variables. Control variables include loan characteristics, bank characteristics,
and several fixed effects. As a corollary analysis, I test interaction effects between distance and bank size
using a production function approach that performs a simple one-tailed t-test on the interaction term of the
two variables (e.g., distance and bank size).
For a sensitivity analysis, I use default rank, the rank variable of default, with negative binomial
regression models. This specification uses the negative binomial distribution that is a discrete probability
distribution of the number of successes in a sequence of independent and identically distributed Bernoulli
trials before a specified number of failures occur. As discussed, this approach reduces my concerns about
the abnormal effects of outliers.
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To refine the effects of distance and bank size on default, I use two approaches: segmented
regression with seemingly unrelated (SU) post-estimation, and replacing new variables, including same
city, same state, national bank (16), and national bank (41), with the existing variables of interest,
respectively. The segmented regression approach is used to find the optimal range of independent
variables to differentiate the effects of variables on the dependent variable. When analyzing a relationship
between a dependent and an independent variable, it may be apparent that for different ranges of
independent variables, different linear relationships occur. In these cases, a single linear model may not
provide an adequate description and a nonlinear model may not be appropriate. Segmented regression is a
form of regression that allows multiple linear models to be fit to the data for different ranges of
independent variables. Breakpoints are the values of independent variables where the slope of the linear
function drastically changes. I use SU post-estimation whether the resulting two regression coefficients of
independent variable are statistically different or not. SU post-estimation consists of several regression
equations (e.g., two regressions in my analysis), and each equation is a valid linear regression on its own.
These equations are estimated separately and allow me to compare the resulting regression coefficients of
independent variables that are included in both equations.
As discussed, to examine more specific effects of city and state boarder lines on default, I replace
distance with same city and same state in some specifications. Moreover, I replace bank size with
national bank (16) and national bank (41) in some specification to examine the effects of the range of
locations covered by a bank on default.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. In Panel A, Group 1 (i.e., all samples) has 683
observations and is categorized into two groups: Group 2 (i.e., default) and Group 3 (i.e., paid in full).
Columns report the distribution of samples and the summary statistics categorized by my independent
variables, including distance and bank size. The first column reports the distribution of all samples. Group
2 has 56 observations and accounts for 8% of samples; and Group 3 has 627 observations and accounts
for 92% of samples. The proportion of each group is overall consistent with the statistics provided by
prior studies (e.g., De Andrade and Lucas 2009).
In the second column, I observe that Group 2 has, on average, a considerably greater distance
(i.e., 250.32) than Group 3 does (i.e., 205.76). These differences are statistically significant at the 1%
level and consistent with my prediction made in Hypothesis 1. I also observe, in the third column, that
Group 3 indicates, on average, greater bank size (i.e., 13.20) than Group 2 does (i.e., 13.07). These
statistics are supportive of my prediction made in Hypothesis 2. However, these statistics need to be
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interpreted with caution because they are simply univariate results and may be biased due to unobserved
heterogeneity.
Panel B reports summary statistics for the five groups of variables used in the following analyses.
These groups include dependent variables, variables of interest, loan characteristics, bank characteristics,
and environmental characteristics. Start-ups borrow, on average, $274 thousand with a 9.97% interest
rate. Banks have, on average, $8.50 billion of total assets; and $107 million of net incomes.2
Table 1. Summary statistics
Panel A: Dependent variable

1. All samples
2. Default
3. Paid in full

Sample distribution
N
%
683
100.00
56
8.00
627
92.00

Distance
Mean
S.D.
209.421
539.822
250.321
606.849
205.768
533.814

Bank size
Mean
S.D.
13.084
2.533
13.074
2.598
13.195
2.528

Panel B: Variables
N

Mean

All samples
S.D.

Min

Max

1. Dependent variables
Default
Default rank

683
683

0.883
342.000

2.986
197.164

0.000
1.000

13.195
683.000

2. Variables of interest
Distance
Bank size

683
683

209.422
13.084

539.823
2.533

0.000
8.863

2491.000
18.993

3. Loan characteristics
Loan amount
Loan interest rate

683
683

11.767
9.970

1.405
2.657

8.577
4.250

14.568
23.250

4. Bank characteristics
Bank net income

683

8.511

2.796

0.693

14.525

5. Environmental characteristics
Ownership fixed effects
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects

683
683
683

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00

4.2. Effects of distance and bank size on default
To understand the effects of distance and bank size on default, I obtain benchmark results by
using several OLS and NB regression models presented in Table 2. Model 1 uses the OLS specification to
estimate the effect of distance on default. Distance indicates a positive and significant regression

2

These numbers are calculated by converting logarithms back to natural numbers.
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coefficient on default at the 1% level. More specifically, and by converting logarithms back to natural
numbers, as the distance between a start-up and a bank increases beyond 1 mile, the amount of default
increases, on average, $4.45. These statistics support my first hypothesis. Model 2 includes bank size as
an independent variable and shows that bank size decreases default, with the effect statistically significant
at the 1% level. This result supports my second hypothesis. For a corollary analysis, I include the
interaction term of two independent variables (i.e., distance×bank size) to consider the interaction effects
of two variables in Model 3. Distance×bank size indicates a negative and significant regression
coefficient at the 1% level. These statistics suggest that the effect of distance on default is more salient
when start-ups borrow loans from smaller banks. These interaction effects are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Interaction effects of distance and bank size

8

Dependent variable

7.5
7
6.5
Low bank size
High bank size

6
5.5
5
4.5
4
Low distance

High distance

To control for the abnormal effects of outliers, I use the NB specification using the rank variable
of default, default rank, in Model 4. Consistent with the result in Model 1, distance indicates a positive
and significant regression coefficient at the 1% level. These results suggest that my finding in Model 1 is
robust against the effects of outliers. In Model 5, I replace distance with bank size. The results show that
bank size has a negative and significant effect at the 1% level, supporting my finding in Model 2. I
include all the independent variables of interest in Model 6 and find that these results are consistent with
my findings in Model 3. As a result, I conclude that two hypotheses are supported.
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Table 2. Effects of distance and bank size on default

Dependent variable

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

OLS
(3)

Default

Default

Default

***

-0.455***
(0.093)
-0.430***
(0.119)
0.067
(0.061)
10.615***
(2.746)

-0.464***
(0.093)
-0.425***
(0.118)
-0.016
(0.147)
10.101***
(2.830)

1.290***
(0.085)
-0.082***
(0.012)
-0.075***
(0.005)
-0.415***
(0.095)
-0.441***
(0.120)
0.007
(0.152)
6.153***
(2.122)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

0.253
(0.015)

Distance

-0.073***
(0.011)

Bank size
Distance×Bank size
Loan amount
Loan interest rate
Bank net income
Constant
Ownership fixed effects
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects

NB
(4)
Default
rank
0.021***
(0.001)

NB
(5)
Default
rank

-0.040***
(0.007)
-0.033***
(0.008)
0.005
(0.004)
12.142***
(0.134)

-0.041***
(0.007)
-0.032***
(0.008)
0.000
(0.011)
12.131***
(0.152)

NB
(6)
Default
rank
1.182***
(0.006)
-0.911***
(0.011)
-0.711***
(0.023)
-0.361***
(0.078)
-0.034***
(0.008)
0.003
(0.011)
12.032***
(0.154)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.811***
(0.112)

N
683
683
683
683
683
683
F (Log likelihood)
-1.6e+03
-1.6e+03
-1.6e+03
-7.7e+03
-7.7e+03
-7.7e+03
Prob>F (Chi2)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.0000
0.000
0.000
R2 (Pseudo R2)
0.194
0.194
0.198
0.131
0.142
0.189
Note. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Distance is divided by
1000 to adjust its unit in the results.

4.3. Refining the effects of distance and bank size on default
I further explore to refine the effects of distance and bank size on default in Table 3. In Models 1
and 2, I carry out a segmented regression approach and optimize a break point (distance=20) where the
slope of the linear function changes to better fit to the data for different ranges of distance. Specifically, in
Model 1 I run an OLS regression model with the group of samples that report distance≤20. In Model 2, I
run an OLS regression model with the group of samples that report distance>20. I find the regression
coefficient of distance is 7.484 in Model 1. This slope significantly decreases to 0.186 in Model 2. SU
post-estimation tests the regression coefficients of distance across Models 1 and 2, and shows two
regression coefficients are significantly different at the 5% level (χ2=6.73 and Prob>χ2=0.018). These
results suggest that I find robust empirical evidence that start-ups that borrow from non-local banks tend
to experience greater rates of default. Moreover, this effect of distance is significantly greater within the
range of 20 miles.
To examine more specific effects of border lines, I include same city and same state in Models 3
and 4. While same city indicates -0.158 of regression coefficients with the effect statistically significant at
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the 1% level in Model 3, same state indicates -0.060 of regression coefficient at the 1% level in Model 4.
These contrasting regression coefficients can be interpreted in a way that if start-ups borrow 7(a) loans
from banks located within the same city, their default risks considerably decrease. However, these
boundary effects significantly decrease when start-ups borrow the loans from banks located within the
same state. Conclusively, the effects of distance are greater when start-ups are located within the radius of
20 miles from lending banks or within same city border lines. These results suggest that the role of soft
information is salient within these spatial ranges; and it is not necessarily much greater as the distance
increases.
In Models 5 and 6, I use similar steps from Models 1 and 2 to better fit the data for different
ranges of bank size. I optimize a break point (bank size=11.69) and split the sample into two groups: bank
size≤11.69 and bank size>11.69. While the regression coefficient of bank size in Model 5 is -0.012, bank
size in Model 6 is 0.071. These results suggest that the negative effects of bank size on default are more
salient in the range of bank size≤11.69. This finding is interpreted in a way that the size of banks
decreases the likelihood of start-ups’ defaults when lending banks are small and medium size banks.
However, these effects are not necessarily consistent for very large banks.
Given the positive effects of large banks on start-ups’ defaults, I redefine large banks as banks
that operate in several states and use two independent variables, national bank (16) and national bank
(41), in Models 7 and 8. In Model 7, national bank (16) indicates a negative and significant regression
coefficient, suggesting that national banks that operate in at least 16 states have decreased defaults. In
Model 8, the regression coefficient of national bank (41) is considerably greater than that of national
bank (16) in Model 7, suggesting that national banks that operate over 41 states have significantly
increased the defaults. Combined together, I conclude that start-ups’ defaults tend to decrease as the size
of lending bank increases up to a point, but when the bank is too large, the defaults begin to increase.
Arguably, this is because a large bank, when compared with its competitors, has difficulty maintaining a
decentralized decision making structure that allows it to respond more to local market competition
(Canales and Nanda 2011).
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Table 3. Refining the effects of distance and bank size on default

Dependent variable
Distance
Bank size

OLS
(1)
Default
7.484***
(1.853)
0.078
(0.021)

OLS
(2)
Default
0.186***
(0.013)
-0.174***
(0.018)

Same city

OLS
(3)
Default

OLS
(4)
Default

-0.072***
(0.017)
-0.158***
(0.011)

-0.070***
(0.018)

OLS
(5)
Default
0.433***
(0.038)
-0.012
(0.032)

OLS
(6)
Default
0.053***
(0.018)
0.071***
(0.018)

OLS
(7)
Default
0.238***
(0.016)

OLS
(8)
Default
0.064***
(0.020)

-0.060***
(0.020)

Same state

-0.045**
(0.019)

National bank (16)

-0.315**
(0.158)
-0.375***
(0.141)
0.170
(0.347)
7.120*
(3.996)

-0.538***
(0.124)
-0.661***
(0.235)
0.014
(0.184)
3.963
(7.073)

-0.474***
(0.094)
-0.431***
(0.119)
-0.011
(0.149)
10.678***
(2.883)

-0.455***
(0.092)
-0.433***
(0.120)
-0.009
(0.148)
10.506***
(3.024)

-0.362*
(0.205)
-0.385*
(0.221)
-0.413
(0.318)
-1.039
(6.185)

-0.565***
(0.132)
-0.563***
(0.151)
-0.002
(0.233)
9.328**
(3.691)

-0.417***
(0.091)
-0.430***
(0.117)
-0.002
(0.064)
9.920***
(2.693)

1.199*
(0.689)
-0.418***
(0.099)
-0.441***
(0.120)
0.058
(0.059)
10.380***
(2.772)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

National bank (41)
Loan amount
Loan interest rate
Bank net income
Constant
SME structure fixed effects
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects

N
380
303
683
683
261
422
683
683
F (Log likelihood)
-915.283
-669.711
-1.6e+03
-1.6e+03
-628.716
-965.414
-1.6e+03
-1.6e+03
Prob>F (Chi2)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
R2 (Pseudo R2)
0.263
0.370
0.196
0.194
0.274
0.309
0.209
0.199
Note. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Distance is divided by 1000 to adjust its unit in the
results. SU post-estimation tests the regression coefficients of distance across Models 1 and 2, and shows two regression coefficients are
significantly different at the 5% level (χ2=5.73 and Prob>χ2=0.0167). Similarly, regression coefficients of bank size are significantly different at
the 1% level across Models 5 and 6 (χ2=43.97 and Prob>χ2=0.000).

5. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examines what information is used to evaluate and select promising high-tech startups in the entrepreneurial lending market. Based on SBA 7(a) loan activities involved with information
technology based start-ups, this study finds that these start-ups tend to experience a lower rate of default if
they are close to the lending banks and the lending banks are of considerable size. These conditions
facilitate the lending banks to collect and utilize soft information regarding the focal start-ups.
These findings clarify the contributions of this study. First, the prior literature has not fully
examined the nature of information used in the entrepreneurial lending market. This study attempts to
fulfill this gap in the entrepreneurial finance literature by analyzing the defaults of high-tech start-ups.
This analysis highlights the relational configuration between high-tech start-ups and lending banks. By
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doing so, this study contributes to the ongoing debate about the optimal mechanism for nurturing high
technology based entrepreneurs by the SBA.
Secondly, my findings expand our understanding about the entrepreneurial lending market by
examining how a lending bank’s location and size serve to access soft information regarding high-tech
start-ups. This study suggests that a bank’s capacity to access soft information reduces information
asymmetry between the bank and high-tech start-ups, thereby enhancing effective selections on promising
high-tech start-ups.
Finally, this study expands the information asymmetry theory within the context of
entrepreneurial lending market. This theoretical application is particularly suitable to analyze how hightech start-ups are willing to reveal soft information and what information lending banks use to reduce
information asymmetry that is common in the entrepreneurial lending market.
Limitations from this study provide avenues for future research. This study did not fully consider
the characteristics of start-ups mainly due to the lack of available data. To alleviate this concern, at least
in part, this study used several fixed effects, including ownership, state, and year fixed effects. These
fixed effects, however, cannot perfectly control for the several characteristics of high-tech start-ups,
including firm specific technology and operation factors. Future studies need to examine how a start-up’s
specific characteristics interact with its entrepreneurial debt financing strategy to enhance the start-up’s
consequent performance.
Furthermore, future studies could probe more deeply into what financing sources a start-up tried
to access, how it behaved with the financing sources, and whether the access was successful, prior to
obtaining SBA loans. For example, it is possible that a start-up searched lending opportunities at larger or
local banks but was rejected prior to applying for SBA loans at a distant bank. This possibility may
provide alternative explanations for the empirical results of this study. Future studies need to more fully
explore the dynamics of a start-up’s debt financing activities.
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